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PRIVATE LAW
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Joseph Dainow*
TORTS
Blanchard v. Blanchard1 was a suit by one brother against
another, both residents of Louisiana, as a result of an automobile
accident which happened in Texas. There was no doubt about the
defendant's negligence, but the Texas guest statute imposes lia-
bility only if the driver's negligence is gross and wanton. The
court found that the defendant's negligence was indeed of such
a nature and awarded a judgment for the plaintiff.
This decision is based upon the traditional conflicts rule of
lex loci delicti, characterizing the place of the tort as the place
where the impact or accident occurred (Texas). Under Louisi-
ana law, the driver's liability would attach for a lesser degree
of negligence, but the court did not consider the applicability
of Louisiana law because liability did attach anyway under the
more severe test. The concurring opinion accepted the majority
view because it maintained the defendant's liability under the
alternative which was most favorable to him, but not without
asking what should really be the proper conflicts rule in Lou-
isiana today for problems of tort liability.
As pointed out in the concurring opinion, the lex loci delicti
conflicts rule is not statutory but was adopted by our juris-
prudence from general Anglo-American sources. Since the mean-
ing and interpretation of the rule are changing in Anglo-Ameri-
can law, the question is posed whether the Louisiana applications
of the rule should not reflect the new trends. Although the an-
swer can only be given by the courts themselves, the question
evokes comment and merits serious consideration.
Two reasons suggest themselves in favor of following the
trends in recent Anglo-American developments.2 One is the
logical continuation of following the patterns of the original
sources; the other is the maintenance of uniformity. However,
from a realistic and practical point of view, such a position is
only warranted if the new trends answer the present-day Lou-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 180 So. 2d 564 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
2. Id. at 567.
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isiana needs and interests as well as the traditional rule did at
the time of its adoption. While making this observation for gen-
eral consideration, I would nevertheless agree with the con-
curring opinion in the present case "that there is in truth little
reason for Texas law to furnish the duty to be enforced by a
Louisiana court in a suit between Louisiana residents arising out
of an accident of a car based and insured in Louisiana." '
DIVORCE
A divorce rendered in a sister state is entitled to full faith
and credit if the rendering court had jurisdiction by reason of
at least the domicile of one of the parties.4 Despite the real ab-
sence of such jurisdictional facts, the same result is produced
if either of the principles of res judicata or estoppel precludes
going behind the decree which has the appearance of validity. In
Turpin v. Turpin, the plaintiff had obtained an Arkansas di-
vorce while both spouses continued to reside and be domiciled in
Louisiana. However, in view of the fact that both spouses had
already remarried, the court followed a prior decision of the
Louisiana Supreme Court6 and held that "plaintiff's acceptance
and acquiescence serves to estop her from attacking the validity
of the Arkansas divorce."7 Whether the facts in connection with
the Arkansas proceedings would also have supported a plea of
res judicata is not indicated, and is unnecessary to the decision.
In Boudreaux v. Welch,8 the plaintiff sued for the wrongful
death of her husband, but she lost in the trial court and again
in the court of appeal. The court of appeal held that she was not
the lawful wife of the decedent on account of the invalidity of
the Mississippi divorce from her prior marriage. The legal issue
centered on whether Louisiana must give full fatih and credit to
a divorce rendered in a sister state where neither spouse was
domiciled. After the institution of the Mississippi divorce suit,
the defendant in that suit had signed a "written waiver of serv-
ice and entry of appearance," and it was contended by the plain-
tiff in the principal case that this had amounted to a personal
appearance and voluntary submission to the Mississippi court
3. Ibid.
4. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
5. 186 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
6. Rouse v. Rouse, 219 La. 1065, 55 So. 2d 246 (1951). See comments in 13
LA. L. REV. 232-34 (1953).
7. 186 So. 2d at 651.
8. 180 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965), writ granted, 248 La. 800, 182
Sc.2d 75 (1966).
[Vol. XXVII
PRIVATE LAW
and that the question of jurisdiction came within the res judicata
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.9 The court of
appeal's denial of a recognition was based on the prior Louisiana
Supreme Court's decision in Eaton v. Eaton,10 where a "waiver
of summons and entry of appearance" was distinguished from
res judicata, and held insufficient as a submission to the juris-
diction.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded,1 ' hold-
ing that the case was controlled by the principle enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Muelberger.1 2
In that case, a daughter was precluded from making a collateral
attack in New York against the Florida divorce of her parents
even though she had not been a party to the suit. The Louisiana
Supreme Court also pointed out that in the Eaton case, relied
upon by the court of appeal, the waiver of summons and entry
of appearance had been executed before the institution of the
divorce suit, whereas in the present case it had been signed after
the commencement of the proceedings and therefore more prop-
erly constituted a submission to the court's jurisdiction.
Since the question of full faith and credit involves a consti-
tutional interpretation, the patterns of decision are determined
by the United States Supreme Court. The problems of migra-
tory divorce have existed on a national scale for a very long
time; the Court's earlier policy of discouragement (in Haddock
and Atherton) for the purpose of both social stability and uni-
formity of status proved to be a failure, and the more recent
position has been to salvage at least the uniformity policy (Wil-
liams, Sherrer, Coe, etc.).13 In this connection, it should be noted
that, if the plaintiff had been suing for the wrongful death of
her first husband, she would have lost because the divorce would
have held good against her. 14
The Louisiana Supreme Court's majority opinion considered
the problem before it as "exactly the case"'15 of Johnson v. Muel-
berger, in which the United States Supreme Court had said:
9. Cited 180 So. 2d at 727.
10. 227 La. 992, 81 So. 2d 371 (1955); see comments in 26 LA. L. REV.
257-58 (1956).
11. 192 So. 2d 356 (La. 1966).
12. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
13. Dainow. Policy Considerations in Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition.
10 LA. L. REV. 54 (1949).
14. See Turpin v. Turpin, supra; and Rouse v. Rouse, supra.
15. 192 So. 2d at 359.
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" 'When a divorce cannot be attacked for lack of juris-
diction by parties actually before the court or strangers in
the rendering state, it cannot be attacked by them anywhere
in the Union. The Full Faith and Credit Clause forbids'."'16
(Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, issue had been joined when the signed waiver
of summons and entry of appearance had been filed in the rec-
ord, and "this was sufficient to foreclose the jurisdictional ques-
tion as res judicata."'7
On the point that an opportunity to litigate the jurisdictional
question is all that is necessary, there can be no difference of
opinion now. However, the scope of the words "or strangers"
in the Johnson case can stand re-examination in the light of the
basic meaning of res judicata.
Generally, the principle of res judicatal s applies to the orig-
inal parties of the suit and those in privity with them. The law
of a particular state can specify a broader or a narrower inter-
pretation, and under the federal full faith and credit clause a
sister state judgment must be given the same effect in the forum
as it has in the state where rendered.
In the Johnson case, a daughter claimed certain rights as
legatee under her father's will as against his wife of a subse-
quent marriage. The rights claimed by the daughter were
derived through her father, and since he could not attack his
prior divorce, she was held to be likewise precluded. The word
"stranger" in the Johnson case refers to the daughter because
she was not in any way personally involved in her parent's
divorce action. In the light of this limiting fact about the narrow
holding of that case, there may be doubt about extending its
applicability to any and all kinds of strangers.
In the case under discussion, the collateral attack on the prior
divorce was made by the defendant in a wrongful death action
resulting from an automobile accident. There was absolutely
no link or relationship between this Louisiana defendant and the
Mississippi divorce proceeding. The application of the res judi-
16. Quoted id. at 359.
17. Id. at 359.
18. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 38, 259 (4th ed., Scoles 1964); LEFLAR,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 129, § 70 (1959); EHRENZWEIO, CONFLICT OF LAWS 233,
251-54 (1962); STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 130, 300 (3d ed.
1963).
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cata principle to this situation appears to be stretching the
point beyond its flexibility. It is not inconceivable that the law
of Mississippi might forbid such a collateral attack, but this was
not shown.
On the policy question, if the objective of the United States
Supreme Court was to preserve uniformity of status, it can be
argued that no collateral attack should be permitted by anybody,
regardless of the actual absence of essential jurisdictional facts.
However, this would go against the grain of well-established
rules that a sister-state judgment is not entitled to full faith
and credit when the rendering court lacked jurisdiction, unless
the complainant is precluded from doing so by the rules of res
judicata. Res judicata forbids reopening the jurisdiction ques-
tion; it does not say that there was jurisdiction where there
was not. If there actually was good jurisdiction, the judgment
is entitled to full faith and credit against anybody and every-
body. Res judicata operates differently and only against the
parties and their privies, in whatever way that it is legislatively
or judicially interpreted in the rendering state.
The dissenting opinion in the Louisiana Supreme Court main-
tained that the divorce decree would have been subject to col-
lateral attack in Mississippi and therefore was not entitled to
full faith and credit, 19 but without drawing the distinction con-
cerning res judicata as described in the comments above.
ALIMONY
Succession of King2 presented the unusual problem of "post-
demise alimony" claimed by a divorced woman from the estate
of her deceased ex-husband, whose succession was being ad-
ministered in Louisiana. The divorce had been rendered in
Florida; this incorporated an alimony settlement, the install-
ments of which had been paid until the husband's death. The
present claim is for future alimony commuted into a lump sum
on the basis of the plaintiff's 20-year life expectancy. The de-
fendant's exception of no cause of action was maintained with
the aid of one concurring opinion, and there was also a dissent;
although a writ of review was granted,2 1 the parties reached an
amicable settlement so that the matter was "dismissed with
19. 192 So. 2d at 360, 363.
20. 184 So. 2d 583 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
21. 249 La. 386, 186 So. 2d 631 (1966).
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prejudice" by the Louisiana Supreme Court.2 2 This leaves the
question moot, but the issue is one worth noting. Each of the
three judges of the court of appeal wrote a separate opinion.
What appears as the judgment of the court is based upon the
finding that the alimony part of the Florida decree was subject
to modification in Florida and, since it was accordingly not a
final judgment, it was not entitled to full faith and credit in
Louisiana. Furthermore, since the decedent had left a substan-
tial legacy to his former wife, she was not in necessitous cir-
cumstances, and the combination of both benefits would exceed
the marital fourth allowed to a destitute widow under Louisiana
law.23
The concurring opinion treated the original alimony agree-
ment as merged in the Florida judgment, and considered that
the wife's proper remedy would have been to ask the Florida
equity court to grant a lump sum out of the estate in lieu of the
alimony.
The dissenting opinion maintained that in the facts of this
case under the law of Florida the wife had a cause of action in
Florida as a charge on the decedent's estate, and that Louisiana
was obliged to recognize and enforce an obligation established by
a valid Florida judgment in accordance with Florida law. The
dissenting judge crystallized the difference on the bench as fol-
lows:
"The concept of post-demise alimony is foreign to the laws
and jurisprudence of Louisiana. My reluctant willingness to
accept the concept for application in the instant case as op-
posed to the unwillingness of my colleagues, who form the
majority, to do so, is the basic point of difference between
US.' '24
Furthermore, the dissent continued, although the original ali-
mony adjudication was subject to modification (and assuming
the power of the Louisiana court to entertain an application
for such modification), the executor had not attempted to do so.
This leaves the Florida judgment in continuing effect with the
monthly payments continuing to accrue and be executory.
As a matter of "full faith and credit" a valid sister-state
judgment must be recognized and enforced to the same extent
22. 249 La. 603, 188 So. 2d 75 (1966).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2382 (1870).
24. 184 So. 2d at 589.
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as it would be in the rendering state. Since Florida law treats
accrued installments of alimony as executory and not subject to
modification, 25 the plaintiff had a cause of action, at least to the
extent of the installments accrued since the husband's death.
With reference to future installments, it is to be noted that
there was no alleged basis of invalidity of the Florida judgment
and it must therefore be treated as fully effective until modified.
No such effort had been made by the decedent or his executor,
and again it would appear that the plaintiff had a cause of
action.
Furthermore, since the alimony agreement was incorporated
into the divorce decree, the Florida law recognizes such alimony
payments as a charge on the decedent's estate.2 No distinction
is drawn between accrued and future installments. This judgment
is entitled to have the same effect in Louisiana as it has in
Florida, including the possibility of commuting the ,future in-
stallments into a single lump sum payment. In view of the fact
that the succession assets were being administered in Louisiana,
the plaintiff's only practical recourse was here, and, to say the
very least, her suit should have been entertained for a thorough
consideration of the merits.
Finally, if the dissenting evaluation of the basic difference
between the judges is correct, the real motivation behind the
majority can be identified more accurately and technically as
the objection of local Public policy. If the plaintiff's suit were
based on an original cause of action involving an ordinary choice-
of-law problem, there would be place for the public policy bar
to the suit, or even other considerations of Louisiana interests
in the particular case. However, since the suit was based on a
valid Florida judgment, there is no place for such considerations
where constitutional full faith and credit are required.
The irony of it all is that the same practical result might
have been reached in a much more defensible legal manner by
permitting the suit and by exercising the same power of modi-
fication for future installments as existed in the Florida courts
under Florida law. Then, if the plaintiff were found not to be
in necessitous circumstances by reason of the substantial legacy
($40,000), the future installments might well have been modified
and commuted into the lump round figure of zero.
25. See authorities cited at 184 So. 2d 592.
26. See authorities cited at 184 So. 2d 590-91.
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